Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 34

Issue 3

Article 5

1946

Evidence--Privileged Confidential Communications--Who May
Assert and Who May Waive the Privilege
Fred B. Redwine
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Evidence Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Redwine, Fred B. (1946) "Evidence--Privileged Confidential Communications--Who May Assert and Who
May Waive the Privilege," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 34: Iss. 3, Article 5.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol34/iss3/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

EVIDENCE-PRIVILEGED CONFIDENTIAL COMMIUNICATIONS-WHO MKAY ASSERT AND WHO MAY
WAIVE THE PRIVILEGE
There are certain relationships in which communications,
given in confidence because of the relationship between the
parties, are generally considered to be conditionally qualified or
privileged.'
The relationships in which confidential communications are most usually accepted as privileged are: communications between attorney and client, communications between husband and wife, communications between physician and
patient, and to a lesser extent, priest (or minister) and
penitent.2
Although a given communication may be privileged, the
question as to who may assert the privilege often arises. The
answer is loosely stated that the privilege belongs to the cominuicant 3 but that rule cannot control all situations in which
the question is met.
The issue is frequently confused by the power to waive the
privilege which belongs to the person for whose benefit the
privilege is permitted. 4 The power of waiver is so much a part
of the privilege that it must, of necessity, be considered in any
discussion of the right to assert thep'ivilege.
In the case of a communication between attprney and client
it is sometimes said that the privilege may be urged by the attorney or his client.; But if the client substantially divulges
the confidential information the attorney will not be permitted
to assert the privilege and may be compelled to testify. 6 In such
a case the client is said to have waived the privilege.7
Likewise, in the case of physician and patient the privilege
18 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) Sec. 2285.
2Ibid.

See People v. Rosa, et al., 268 Mich. 462, 256 N. W. 483 (1934).

'Cabe v. State, 182 Ark. 49, 30 S. W. (2d) 855 (1930); Harvey v.
Silber et al., 300 Mich. 510, 2 N. W. (2d) 483 (1942); Wells v. City of
Jefferson et al., 345 Mo. 239, 132 S. W. (2d) 1006 (1939); In re Fisher,
51 F. (2d) 424 (S. D. N. Y. 1931)

'Baldwin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 125 F. (2d) 812

(1942); see State v. Dunkley, 85 Utah 546, 39 P. (2d) 1097 (1935).

'"Knaust Bros., Inc. v. Goldschlog, 34 F. Supp. 87 (S. D. N. Y.
1939).
7 Ibid.
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belongs to the patient.8 If the patient sees fit to waive the privilege it cannot be asserted by the physician.9 However, in the
case of physician and patient, as well as that of attorney and
client, the rule that the privilege belongs to the communicant
fails. In both instances the communications of attorney to
client or physician to patient on the matter confided to them, by
client or patient, are given the same protection that communications from client or patient to attorney or physician are
given.' 0 They are, in fact, treated as part of the same communications and may be waived by the client or patient. 1'
If the privilege is waived by the person for whose benefit it
is created it ceases to exist and can be asserted by no other person.1 2 It may, to that extent, be said that the privilege belongs
to the person intended to be protected. But, in the absence of a
waiver, it does not follow that no other person may assert the
privilege. At the death of the person holding the privilege it
passes to his representative 13 and may be waived or asserted by
them.' 4 In this case, however, the privilege is not available to
persons antagonistic to the interests of the deceased.' 8
Communications between husband and wife raise a peculiar
problem. In the case of attorney and client or physician and
patient a relationship is fostered for the protection of an individual.' 6 That does not seem to be true of communications
"Novak, et al. v. Chicago Fraternal Life Association, 136 Kan.
609, 16 P. (2d) 507 (1932); Harvey v. Silber et al., 300 Mich. 510, 2
N.W.(2d) 483 (1942).
'Wells v. City of Jefferson et al., 345 Mo. 239, 132 S. W. (2d)
1006 (1939).
8 WIGmIIORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) Sec. 2320.
' 1 State v. Dunkley, 85 Utah 546, 39 P. (2d) 1097 (1935).
In re Fisher, 51 F. (2d) 424 (S. D. N. Y. 1931); Coles v. Harsch,
129 Ore. 11, 276 Pac. 248 (1929).
"Fitzgerald v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 149 S. W. (2d)
389 (Mo. 1941). ("Representative" as used by the courts in this connection does not carry the technical meaning of that word. It includes not only the personal representative of the deceased but also
his heirs, or even the beneficiary under the life insurance policy).
I O'Brien v. General Accident, Fire and Life Assurance Corp.,
Limited, 42 F. (2d) 48 (C. C. A. 8, 1930) (Beneficiary permitted to
waive the privilege); Fitzgerald v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,
149 S. W. (2d) 389 (Mo. 1941); In re Williams' Estate, 39 N. Y. S.
(2d) 741 (1942) (Attorney permitted to assert privilege); Contra:
Krumb, et al. v. Porter, et al., 152 S. W. (2d) 495 (Texas 1941).
1 Calhoun v. Jacobs et al., 141 F. (2d) 729 (C. C. A. D. C. 1944);
Boyles v. Cora, 232 Iowa 822, 6 N. W. (2d) 401 (1942); Heir v.
Farmers Mutual Life Ins. Co., 104 Mont. 471, 67 P. (2d) 831 (1937);
Boyd et al. v. Kilmer et al., 285 Pa. 533, 132 Atl. 709 (1926).
" In re Turner, 51 F. Supp. 740 (W. D. Ky. 1943).
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between husband and wife. Here it is the very relationship itself that is being protected. Who then should be allowed to control the privilege? May one spouse assert the privilege even
though the other waives, or offers to waive, the privilege? May
one waive in the absence of the other? Numerous results appear
to have been obtained. Some jurisdictions hold that the privilege belongs to the communicant and can be asserted by no other
person. 17 Other jurisdictions permit either spouse to waive the
privilege,' while some courts look at the communications as excluded rather than privileged. 19
The privilege for communications between priest and
penitent is purely statutory and has been accepted in only a
20
limited number of jurisdictions.
The most difficult problem arises when the person in whose
favor the privilege operates is not a party to the action. It may
arise in either of two cases:
1. The owner of the privilege is present at the trial, but not
a party, and asserts the privilege; or
2. The owner of the privilege is not present, and a party
to the action attempts to assert the privilege.
In the first case the privilege is protected and the privileged information will be excluded from the evidence. 21 This
is true whether the owner of the privilege or the person to
22
whon he communicated the information is on the stand.
In the second case there is a split in the authorities. Those
jurisdictions holding that the privilege can be asserted only by
the owner of the privilege2 3 would be inconsistent if they permitted the assertion of the privilege to prevail here. Some jurisdictions hold that the privilege should be upheld but that the
erroneous admission of the privileged testimony is not ground for
reversal. 24 Others hold that the party or the witness may asSee People v. Rosa et al., 268 Mich. 462, 256 N. W. 483 (1934).
v. Griffith et al., 173 Minn. 51, 216 N. W. 311
(1927); Coles v. Harsch, 129 Ore. 11, 276 Pac. 248 (1929).
' 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
(3d ed. 1940) Sec. 2334.
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) Sec. 2285.
Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co. v. Vaughn, 88 Ind. App.
561, 163 N. E. 107 (1928); see Murray v. Physical Culture Hotel, Inc.,
17 N. Y. S. (2d) 862 (1940) affirming 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 978 (1939).
In re Turner, 51 F. Supp. 740 (W. D. Ky. 1943).
Ibanez et Ux. v. State, 118 S.W. (2d) 405 (Tex. 1938).
:'
Vance v. State, 182 Miss. 840, 183 So. 280 (1938).
SSommerfeld
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sert the privilege and that it is reversible error to admit the
25
privileged information in evidence.
It seems that so long as the benefit which society derives
from a given relationship warrants the encouragement it receives from privileged communications the preferable rule would
be to reverse the decision when the privilege is erroneously
denied even though the privilege did not belong to the party
asserting it. While it is true that the owner of the privilege will
not have his wrong corrected by the reversal, such a stand does,
however, provide an effective brake for those who would destroy the value of the privilege by introducing the confidential
information. To recognize the privilege is to concede that it
is worthy of protection
FRED B. REDNVIE

zHines et al. v. Howell, 15 S. W. (2d) 1060 (Tex. 1929).

